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Abstract
Due to strong changes in general economic conditions and increasing market volatility, a 
higher level of investments and disinvestments in the dairy sector can be observed. Therefore, 
the simultaneous analysis of firms’ investment and disinvestment decisions under 
consideration of uncertainty and market interventions is of high relevance. In this paper, a 
flexible real options market model is applied to the German dairy sector. The model considers 
disinvestment besides investment options and, moreover, allows the integration and 
assessment of different market interventions that are relevant to the dairy sector. According to 
the results, production ceilings and investment subsidies are preferable to price floors because 
the welfare is less reduced for a given stimulation of the willingness to invest. Moreover, it is 
shown that not considering disinvestment options, which in reality often exist, can lead to 
incorrect valuations of investment strategies at firm level and incorrect policy impact analyses 
at macroeconomic level. 
Keywords:  Investment and disinvestment, real options, competition, policy impact 
analysis, dairy sector. 
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Zusammenfassung
Aufgrund von starken Veränderungen in den politischen Rahmenbedingungen und 
zunehmend volatiler Märkte nehmen sowohl Investitionen als auch Desinvestitionen im 
Milchsektor in den letzten Jahren deutlich zu. Aus diesem Grund ist die simultane Analyse 
von Investitions- und Desinvestitionsentscheidungen landwirtschaftlicher Unternehmen unter 
Berücksichtigung von Unsicherheit und Marktinterventionen von besonderer Relevanz. In 
dem vorliegenden Beitrag wird ein flexibles Realoptionsmodell auf den deutschen 
Milchsektor angewandt. Das Modell berücksichtigt neben Investitionsoptionen auch 
Desinvestitionsoptionen und erlaubt des Weiteren die Integration und Bewertung 
unterschiedlicher Marktinterventionen, die für den Milchsektor relevant sind. Entsprechend 
der Ergebnisse sind sowohl Produktionsobergrenzen als auch Investitionszulagen gleichsam 
Preisuntergrenzen vorzuziehen, da die sektorale Wohlfahrt für eine gegebene Stimulierung 
der Investitionsbereitschaft weniger stark eingeschränkt wird. Außerdem kann gezeigt 
werden, dass die Nicht-Berücksichtigung von Desinvestitionsoptionen, die in der Realität 
häufig vorliegen, zu fehlerhaften Investitionsentscheidungen auf einzelbetrieblicher Ebene 
und fehlerhaften Politikfolgenabschätzungen auf sektoraler Ebene führen kann. 
Schlüsselwörter: Investition und Desinvestition, Realoptionen, Wettbewerb, Politikfolgen-
abschätzung, Milchsektor.
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1 Introduction 
The dairy sector is currently globally exposed to strong changes in general economic 
conditions. Examples for this are the abolishment of the milk production quota in the EU by 
2015, the allocation of additional production quota among the Canadian provinces in the years 
2010 and 2011 as well as governmental investment support programmes for structually weak 
areas, like in the newly-formed German states. In addition, and, at least partially, as a result of 
these changes, milk prices have become more volatile in recent years (Informa Economics, 
2010). In consequence of both the changes in general economic conditions and the increasing 
price volatility, adjustments in the dairy sector in the form of investments and disinvestments 
can be observed. In the German federal state of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerana, for instance, 
the dairy livestock grew by 4,000 heads in the past five years along with a massive national 
investment support programme; the number of farm firms, however, decreased (agrarheute, 
2013). Hence, the simultaneous analysis of investment and disinvestment decisions under 
consideration of uncertainty and different political market interventions in agriculture in 
general, and in the dairy sector in specific, is of high practical relevance. 
In the past two decades, agricultural economists showed that the Real Options Approach 
(ROA) is more advantageous for analysing investments in agriculture than traditional invest-
ment models based on the net present value (NPV) rule (e.g. Carey and Zilberman, 2002; 
Odening et al., 2005; Richards and Patterson, 1998). The reason is that investments in agri-
culture are mostly afflicted by (partially) irreversible costs, uncertainty of the future cash 
flows and temporal flexibility in making the investment. This particularly applies to invest-
ments in the dairy sector (e.g. Engel and Hyde, 2003; Purvis et al., 1995; Tauer, 2006). The 
ROA takes into account explicitly these characteristics through analysing investment decisions 
under dynamic-stochastic conditions and extending the NPV by the value of entrepreneurial 
flexibility.  
The applicability of the ROA to investment problems in the dairy sector, especially under 
consideration of the aforementioned economic environment, however, is problematic (Feil 
and Musshoff, 2013). First, the simultaneous analysis of firms’ investment and disinvestment 
decisions in the real options context is complex. For simplification purposes, the vast majority 
of real options models in agriculture implicitly assume perfect irreversibility of the investment 
costs, that is, disinvestment options do not need to be considered (e.g. McDonald and Siegel, 
1986). In contrast to this, most investments in agriculture in general, and dairy farm invest-
ments in particular, can be abandoned and their costs partially reserved (e.g. Breustedt and 
Glauben, 2007). Moreover, the availability of at least one essential production factor of 
European dairy farming is usually limited, namely the milk quota. This causes strong inter-
dependencies of firms’ investment and disinvestment decisions within a country ore a region, 
because firms cannot grow unless other firms shrink or exit (e.g. Chavas, 2001). However, 
there are only a few real options models that analyse investment and disinvestment decisions 
simultaneously. These models depend on numerical solution procedures because a solution in 
closed form does not exist for the determination of both values (e.g. Hill, 2010; Isik et al., 
2003). 
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Second, most real options models, in particular the aforementioned ones analysing investment 
and disinvestment decisions simultaneously, do not consider competition. With this, they 
implicitly exploit the finding of Leahy (1993), who shows that a competitive investor finds 
the same optimal investment strategy as a myopic planner that ignores other firms’ investment 
and disinvestment decisions. The implication of this finding is that the analysis of optimal 
investment and disinvestment decisions is simplified considerably due to the fact that 
competition does not need to be taken into account: The firms’ optimal investment and 
disinvestment thresholds can be determined without the burdensome and iterative derivation 
of the endogenous equilibrium price process. However, the preconditions for applying this 
optimality property of myopic planning to competitive markets are very restrictive and, at 
least partially, unrealistic. Furthermore, not considering competition is especially problematic 
for the analysis of investments in industries characterised by market interventions, like the 
dairy sector. For a myopic planner who takes prices as exogenously given, merely the effects 
of such measures can be investigated which can be transformed directly into the price process, 
for example, price ceilings (e.g. Dixit, 1991). For many other relevant interventions, however, 
this is not possible or at the very least complex; for example, production quotas. Finally, 
through limiting the perspective to only one myopic firm and not considering competition, the 
welfare effects of market interventions cannot be analysed and therefore, comparative policy 
impact analyses are not possible. 
Third, although a few real options studies explicitly consider competition, they again do not 
allow for disinvestment options (e.g. Feil et al., 2013). The model of Feil et al., for example, 
is capable of directly determining firms’ investment thresholds in competitive markets and 
thus, does not rely on the restrictions associated with exploiting the optimality property of 
myopic planning. For the intention of simplification, their model, however, assumes that the 
investment costs are sunk in total, whereby abandonment options do not need to be 
considered. 
With these research gaps in mind, this paper has three objectives with regard to the dairy 
sector: First, firms’ investment and disinvestment decisions shall be analysed simultaneously 
within the real options context under consideration of different market interventions. Second, 
a detailed assessment of different market interventions shall be enabled. Third, the relevance 
of disinvestment options, which exist in the dairy sector but which are not considered in many 
real options models, shall be investigated both for the valuation of investment projects at firm 
level and for the assessment of market interventions at the macroeconomic level. To achieve 
these objectives, the real options market model developed by Feil and Musshoff (2013) is 
applied to the German dairy sector. The model is solved numerically by linking genetic 
algorithms (GAs) with stochastic simulation. Through this, equilibria in competitive markets 
can be directly determined and a vast modelling flexibility is gained. In particular, different 
market interventions, which are relevant to agriculture in general and to the dairy sector in 
specific, can be integrated and their effects on the firms’ investment and disinvestment 
decisions as well as on the sectoral welfare quantified. For demonstration, a comparative 
analysis of the effects of price floors maintained by governmental purchases of excess supply, 
production ceilings and subsidies on investments is carried out. Price floors constitute the 
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reference to many analytical real options models in the literature; for example, Dixit and 
Pindyck (1994: 296ff.) who also consider investment and disinvestment options simultaneously. 
Moreover, this instrument is frequently used in agriculture, for example in the EU for many 
commodities including milk until the Fischler reform in 2003. Production ceilings can be seen 
as simplified representative for milk quota systems, like in the EU or Canada. And investment 
subsidies are paid in many agricultural sectors, for instance in the newly-formed German 
states for investments into livestock farming. Consequently, the analysis shows that the 
model, first, provides a conceptual decision support with regard to firms’ optimal investment 
strategies and, second, enables detailed policy impact analyses in the dairy sector. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 firstly explains the fundamentals 
of the ROA. In section 3, the structure and the functioning of the real options market model is 
illustrated. After the assumptions for the application of the model to the German dairy sector 
are presented in section 4, the results are discussed in section 5. The paper ends with a 
summary of the main findings and conclusions concerning the model’s application potential 
(section 6). 
2 Theoretical background 
Real options models exploit the analogy between a financial option and an investment or 
disinvestment project (e.g. Abel and Eberly, 1994; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Trigeorgis, 
1996). With an opportunity to invest (disinvest), a firm is holding an “option” analogues to a 
financial call (put) option; it has the right but not the obligation to buy (sell) an asset at any 
time in the future. If the firm invests, it exercises the option by giving up the opportunity of 
waiting for new information to arrive with a potential positive effect on the profitability of the 
investment. This lost continuation value of the option is an opportunity cost that should be 
included as part of the investment costs. Furthermore, it is highly sensitive to the uncertainty 
of the future cash flows. In conclusion, an irreversible investment under uncertainty should 
only be made if the present value of its expected returns exceeds the investment costs by an 
amount equal to the value of waiting for additional information. In comparison to the NPV 
rule, this means that the critical product price at which the firm should invest (in the following 
referred to as investment trigger price) is shifted upwards because the cash flows do not only 
have to compensate the investment costs but also the lost value from deferring the investment. 
Analogously, a firm will only abandon the investment if the present value of its expected 
returns falls below the liquidation value by a considerable amount. This means that the 
disinvestment trigger price is shifted downwards.  
The direct transferability of the financial option pricing theory to real investment problems, 
however, is problematic. Financial options constitute exclusive rights for their owners, whereas 
real investment opportunities are also open to other market participants in competitive markets. 
Thus, exceeding (falling below) the (dis)investment trigger price will also lead to similar 
reactions of competitors, which, taken as a whole, will change sectoral supply and, thus, 
equilibrium prices. In consequence, the price process cannot be considered any longer as 
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exogenous. As the price process determines again the value of the investment project and, 
with this, the investment and disinvestment trigger price, the direct determination of these 
values is considerably complicated. Leahy (1993), however, demonstrates that under perfect 
competition, an investor who decides myopically and ignores potential market entries of 
competitors finds the same trigger prices as a competitive investor. This is explained in the 
following. 
Leahy assumes a perfectly competitive industry consisting of small homogeneous price-taking 
firms, which use the same constant-returns-to-scale technology for production. The 
production output of all firms at time t, which equals the aggregated market supply ܺ௧, is 
subject to depreciation with rate Ȝ as well as investments and disinvestments of the firms in 
additional production capacity. The product price ௧ܲ results from the reactions of all firms in 
the form of ܺ௧ on the exogenous stochastic demand parameter ߤ௧. It is defined by a time-
invariant inverse demand function ܦ, which is assumed to be isoelastic (e.g. Dixit, 1991): 
 
௧ܲ ൌ ܦሺܺ௧ǡ ߤ௧ሻ ൌ ൬
ߤ௧
ܺ௧൰
Ȇ
 (1) 
with 
 Ȇ ൌ െͳߟ  
where ߟ is the price elasticity of demand. Following Leahy and many other real options 
applications, the demand shock is described by a geometric Brownian motion (GBM)1: 
 ߤ௧ ൌ ߙ ή ߤ௧ ή ݐ ൅ ߪ ή ߤ௧ ή ݖ (2) 
ߙ denotes the drift rate and ߪ the volatility. Both parameters are assumed to be constant. ݖ is 
the increment of a Wiener process. The stochastic demand process according to equation (2) 
can be translated into a stochastic price process (Odening et al., 2007): 
  ௧ܲ ൌ ߜመሺ ௧ܲǡ ܺ௧ሻ ή ܺ௧ ൅ ߙො ή ௧ܲ ή ݐ ൅ ߪො ή ௧ܲ ή ݖ (3) 
with 
 ߜመሺ ௧ܲǡ ܺ௧ሻ ൌ െʞ ή ܺ௧ି ଵ ή ௧ܲ  
 ߙො ൌ ʞ ή ߙ ൅ ͳʹ ή ߪ
ଶ ή ሺʞଶ െ ʞሻ  
 ߪො ൌ ʞ ή ߪ  
                                                          
1 By assuming a GBM, the exposition is simplified. However, the presence of a GBM is not essential for 
proving the validity of the optimality property of myopic planning. Baldursson and Karatzas (1997) deliver a 
generalisation.  
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Equation (3) specifies the regulated endogenous stochastic price process as anticipated by a 
competitive investor. The first term on the right-hand side of equation (3) captures price 
changes induced by investments and disinvestments of competitors. A myopic investor, how-
ever, ignores these effects and assumes an unregulated exogenous stochastic price process: 
  ௧ܲ ൌ ߙො ή ௧ܲ ή ݐ ൅ ߪො ή ௧ܲ ή ݖ (4) 
Figure 1 illustrates the respective differences between the regulated endogenous price process 
(cf. equation (3)) and the unregulated exogenous price process (cf. equation (4)) for the case 
of a GBM. Although both simulations utilise identical parameters with a drift rate of ߙ ൌ0% 
and a volatility rate of  
Figure 1. Price dynamics with and without competition (Leahy, 1993) 
 
Note: GBM with ߙ ൌ 0% andߪ ൌ 20%,  ߟ ൌ -1.
 
ߪ ൌ20% and identical random numbers, the sample paths look different: As all firms behave 
in the same way, the endogenous price process anticipated by a competitive investor will be 
truncated upwards as soon as the product price climbs up to a specific investment trigger price 
level. Hence, the investment trigger price constitutes an upper reflecting barrier. By using 
analogous considerations, the disinvestment trigger price generates a lower reflecting barrier 
(Dixit and Pindyck, 1994: 261). The exogenous price process, as assumed by a myopic 
planner, does not show these boundaries. 
Following Leahy, both the competitive investor and the myopic planner find identical optimal 
investment and disinvestment trigger prices. These trigger prices represent the competitive 
equilibrium meaning that the zero-profit-condition is fulfilled for the firms in the market in 
time
Sample path of prices without 
competition (unregulated process)
Sample path of prices with 
competition (regulated process)
Investment trigger price
= upper reflecting barrier
Disinvestment trigger price
= lower reflecting barrier
price
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the long run. According to the model of Dixit and Pindyck (1994, 216ff.), the optimal 
investment trigger price തܲ and the optimal disinvestment trigger price ܲ of a myopic planner 
can be determined by the following system of equations: 
 
െܣ ή ܲఉభ ൅ ܤ ή ܲఉమ ൅ ܲሺݎ െ ߙොሻ ൌ ܫ (5) 
 െߚଵ ή ܣ ή ܲ
ఉభିଵ ൅ ߚଶ ή ܤ ή ܲ
ఉమିଵ ൅ ͳሺݎ െ ߙොሻ ൌ Ͳ (6) 
 െܣ ή ܲఉభ ൅ ܤ ή ܲఉమ ൅ ܲሺݎ െ ߙොሻ ൌ െܧ (7) 
 െߚଵ ή ܣ ή ܲఉభିଵ ൅ ߚଶ ή ܤ ή ܲఉమିଵ ൅
ͳ
ሺݎ െ ߙොሻ ൌ Ͳ (8) 
ܫ represents the investment outlay that a firm must incur for one additional unit of output and 
ܧ represents the cost to abandon it. It might be the case that the investment is partially 
reversible and a liquidation value can be generated, that is, ܧ is negative with ܫ ൅ ܧ ൐ Ͳ.  
ݎ denotes the time-continuous discount rate. Variable costs are not explicitly considered. The 
constants ߚଵ and ߚଶ represent the two roots of the quadratic function (Dixit and Pindyck, 
1994: 142f.): 
 ͳ
ʹ ή ߪො
ଶ ή ߚ ή ሺߚ െ ͳሻ ൅ ߙො ή ߚ െ ݎ ൌ Ͳ  
For ߚଵ and ߚଶ follows: 
 
ߚଵ ൌ
ͳ
ʹ െ
ߙො
ߪොଶ ൅ ඨ൬
ߙො
ߪොଶ െ
ͳ
ʹ൰
ଶ
൅ ʹ ή ݎߪොଶ
 
 
ߚଶ ൌ
ͳ
ʹ െ
ߙො
ߪොଶ െ ඨ൬
ߙො
ߪොଶ െ
ͳ
ʹ൰
ଶ
൅ ʹ ή ݎߪොଶ  
 
By using the four equations (5) to (8), the trigger prices തܲ and ܲ and the constants ܣ and ܤ 
are determined. The equation system cannot be solved in closed form; however, it can be 
proven that a unique solution for തܲ and ܲ exists (Dixit, 1989: Appendix A). This solution can 
be obtained by using iterative approximation procedures.  
Nevertheless, applying the optimality property of myopic planning to competitive markets is 
problematic. For instance, it is not possible or at least very complex, to model any market 
interventions whose effects cannot be transformed directly into the price process, for instance, 
production ceilings. To solve this, a derivation of the endogenous equilibrium price process 
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would be necessary, instead of just using the above system of equations. In the literature, this 
is commonly assessed as not practicable (e.g. Leahy, 1993). In the next section, a real options 
market model will be developed, allowing the derivation of exactly this equilibrium price 
process in competitive markets. Therefore, it does not rely on the preconditions of applying 
the optimality property of myopic planning and can be used more flexibly than other models, 
for example, by allowing the integration and assessment of different market interventions. 
3 The real options market model 
In the following section, a real options market model is presented which allows the simultane-
ous determination of firms’ investment and disinvestment thresholds in the dairy sector under 
consideration of different market interventions. For this purpose, the model of Feil and 
Musshoff (2013) is extended by depreciation, as the production capacity of the firms in the 
dairy sector is not only subject to investments and disinvestments, but also to depreciation of 
most production factors, for example the milking equipment. 
Within the model, a market consisting of ܰ ൌ50 risk-neutral firms is considered. The firms 
are homogenous with regard to their production and investment capabilities. The firms plan in 
discrete time, which is a necessary assumption of numerical evaluation procedures.2 Each 
firm has the option to repeatedly invest in production capacity within the period under 
consideration ܶ, until an exogenously given maximum output capacity ܺ௖௔௣ is reached. 
Investment outlay and production output are proportional, which means that there are no 
economies of scale for the firms. The investment project has an unlimited useful lifetime. 
However, in every period the production output declines corresponding to a geometric 
depreciation rate ߣ. After implementation, the investment can be abandoned and its costs 
partially reversed. Consequently, the production capacity of a firm ݊ in ݐ, resulting in a 
production output ܺ௧௡, can be adjusted in two ways: Either via investments once in a period, 
resulting in an additional production output ௧ܻାο௧௡  in the following period, or via 
disinvestments once in a period, resulting in a reduction in production output ܼ௧ାο௧௡  in the 
following period. Then production follows: 
 ܺ௧ାο௧௡ ൌ ܺ௧௡ ή ሺͳ െ ߣሻ ൅ ௧ܻାο௧௡ െ ܼ௧ାο௧௡ . (9) 
The aggregated production output of all firms represents the market supply ܺ௧. Prices result 
from the reactions of all firms in the form of ܺ௧ on the exogenous industry-wide demand 
shock and hence, need to be determined endogenously within the model. Without loss of 
generality, the relationship between ܺ௧ and ௧ܲ is defined by an isoelastic demand function 
                                                          
2  However, the results according to the analytical model of Dixit and Pindyck (1994: 216ff.) in the absence of 
any market interventions, which are based on a continuous treatment of time, can be approximated by the real 
options market model (cf. subsection 4.1.). 
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according to equation (1). For modelling the stochastic demand parameter ߤ௧, any stochastic 
process can be applied as flexibly as needed.3  
According to the model of homo economicus, all firms maximise their expected NPV. 
Furthermore, all firms have complete information regarding the stochastic demand process 
and the investment and disinvestment behavior of all competitors, whereby they build demand 
expectations for the respective next period. Consequently, all firms should have the same 
optimal investment and disinvestment trigger prices in equilibrium. To derive this Nash 
equilibrium within the model, the competing firms interact by gradually adjusting their 
(initially different) investment and disinvestment trigger prices ( തܲ௡, ܲ௡), as explained in the 
next subsection. Furthermore, it is assumed that in a production period all firms first disinvest 
and then invest, based on their trigger prices and the expected market price. In this context, it 
is technically ensured that ܲ௡ ൏ തܲ௡ for all firms, that is a firm ݊ will not invest if it has 
disinvested immediately before. Due to this system of chronological order, the disinvestments 
accumulated in a period impact the investment decisions of the same period, but not vice 
versa. 
To derive the disinvestment volume of the firms in the first instance, it is assumed that firms 
with a higher disinvestment trigger price have a stronger tendency to abandon the investment. 
Accordingly, all firms are sorted according to their disinvestment trigger prices, starting with 
the highest, i.e. ܲ௠ ൒ ܲ௠ାଵ. Consequently, firm ݉൅ ͳ does not disinvest if firm ݉ has not 
already completely abandoned the investment. Likewise, it is obvious that if firm ݉൅ ͳ 
abandons the investment completely, firm ݉ completely abandons the investment, too. 
Furthermore, in every period ݐ, a marginal (or last) firm exists which disinvests to the extent 
that its disinvestment trigger price equals the expected product price of the next period. For 
the disinvestment volume of a firm ෥݉  in ݐ, corresponding to its additional production output 
in ݐ ൅ οݐ, follows: 
ܼ௧ାο௧௠෥ ൫ܲ௠෥൯ ൌ 
ۏ
ێێ
ێێ
ێ
ۍ
Ͳǡ
ۉ
ۈ
ۇ
ܺ௧௠෥ ή ሺͳ െ ߣሻǡ

ቌ෍ ܺ௧௠ ή ሺͳ െ ߣሻ ൅ ෍ ௧ା୼௧௠ ൫ܲ௠൯
௠෥ିଵ
௠ୀଵ
୒
௠ୀଵ
ቍ െ 3ሺߤ௧ା୼௧ሻሺܲ௠෥ ሻିఎ ی
ۋ
ۊ 
ے
ۑۑ
ۑۑ
ۑ
ې
 (10) 
The “max-query” of equation (10) ensures non-negativity of the disinvestment volume. 
Furthermore, the “min-query” makes sure that a firm ෥݉  cannot abandon more production 
capacity via disinvestments than it has built up in former periods. The “min-query” also 
guarantees that the total quantity of supply is just reduced as long as the disinvestment trigger 
price of the “last” firm equals the expected product price of the next period.  
                                                          
3  Besides industry-wide shocks, firm-specific shocks are not considered within the model for complexity 
reasons. For a combination of both industry-wide and firm-specific shocks, see the more general analytical 
model of Dixit and Pindyck (1994: 277ff.). 
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The investment volume of a firm is derived analogously, i.e. firms with lower investment 
trigger prices have a stronger tendency to invest. All firms are sorted according to their 
investment trigger prices, starting with the lowest, i.e. തܲ௡ ൑ തܲ௡ାଵ. Thus, firm ݊ ൅ ͳ does not 
invest if firm ݊ has not already invested in production capacity up to ܺ௖௔௣Ǥ In every period ݐ, 
it is technically ensured that de facto a marginal (or last) firm exists which invests to the 
extent that its investment trigger price equals the expected product price of the next period. As 
a result of this and the relatively large number of firms (ܰ ൌ 50), the market within the model 
can be seen as an approximation of an atomistic market. For the investment volume of a firm 
෤݊ in ݐ, corresponding to its additional production output in  ݐ ൅ οݐ, follows: 
௧ܻାο௧௡෤ ൫ തܲ௡෤൯ ൌ 
ۏ
ێێ
ێێ
ێ
ۍ
Ͳǡ
ۉ
ۈ
ۇ
ܺ௖௔௣ െ ܺ௧௡෤ ή ሺͳ െ ߣሻ ǡ

3ሺߤ௧ା୼௧ሻ
ሺ തܲ௡෤ሻିఎ െ ቌ෍ܺ௧
௡ ή ሺͳ െ ߣሻ ൅෍ ௧ܻା୼௧௡ ሺ തܲ௡ሻ ൅
௡෤ିଵ
௡ୀଵ
୒
௡ୀଵ
෍ ܼ௧ା୼௧௠ ൫ܲ௠൯
ே
௠ୀଵ
ቍ
ی
ۋ
ۊ 
ے
ۑۑ
ۑۑ
ۑ
ې
 (11) 
Analogously to equation (10), the “max-query” of equation (11) ensures non-negativity of the 
investment volume. The “min-query” makes sure that a firm ෤݊ cannot build-up more 
production capacity via investments than it needs in order to produce its maximum production 
capacity ܺ௖௔௣. Additionally, the “min-query” ensures that the total quantity of supply is only 
expanded as far as the investment trigger price of the “last” invested firm equals the expected 
product price of the next period.  
Finally, an objective function needs to be established which determines the optimal 
investment and disinvestment strategies of the firms. According to the above assumptions, 
each firm aims to maximize the expected NPV of the future cash flows ܨ଴௡, in the real options 
terminology also referred to as an option value by choosing its firm-specific investment 
trigger price തܲ௡ and disinvestment trigger price ܲ௡: 
 
௉ത೙ǡ௉೙൛ܨ଴
௡൫ തܲ௡ǡ ܲ௡൯ൟ ൌ ௉ത೙ǡ௉೙ ቐ෍ቌሺ ௧ܲ െ ݇ሻ ή ܺ௧
௡൫ തܲ௡ǡ ܲ௡൯ െ ݅ ή ݇ ή ෍ ܼ௨௡൫ܲ௡൯
௧
௨ୀ଴
ቍ
ஶ
௧ୀ଴
ή ݁ି௥ή௧ቑ (12) 
The reversibility rate ݅ determines what proportion of the investment costs can be recovered 
upon abandonment. The interest rate ݎ is time-continuous. ݇ represents the total costs of 
investment per output unit and period, consisting of the capital costs of the investment outlay 
ܫ and all other costs to be paid ܿ (e.g. material costs, labor costs): 
 ݇ ൌ ܫ ή ൛݁௥ήο௧ െ ሺͳ െ ߣሻൟ ൅ ܿ (13) 
As there exists no closed-form solution for the described optimisation problem, the model  
is solved numerically by combining GAs with stochastic simulation following Feil and 
Musshoff (2013). 
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Finally, three market interventions are exemplarily implemented into the model. In the case of 
a price floor ௠ܲ௜௡ maintained by governmental purchases of excess supply, the determination 
of the producer’s price has to be modified. Considering the product price ௧ܲ according to 
equation (1), the following applies to the effective producer’s price ௧ܲᇱ:  
 
௧ܲᇱ ൌ  ሼ ௠ܲ௜௡ǡ ௧ܲሽ ൌ  ቊ ௠ܲ௜௡ǡ ൬
ߤ௧
ܺ௧൰
ஈ
ቋ (14) 
Consequently, ௧ܲ in equation (12) is replaced by ௧ܲᇱ. As a reference point, ௠ܲ௜௡ will be 
exogenously fixed as a proportion of the total costs of investment ݇. Following Dixit and 
Pindyck (1994) on the effects of price controls, it is assumed that governmental purchases are 
excluded from the market with no future impact on supply and demand. 
A politically induced production ceiling ܺ௠௔௫ determines the maximum permissible overall 
production capacity in the market. As soon as ܺ௠௔௫ is exceeded, firms are not allowed to 
invest in additional capacity, even if their investment trigger prices are lower than the market 
price. Hence, the formula for the investment size of a firm ෤݊ according to equation (11) needs 
to be supplemented by a further “min-query”: 
௧ܻାο௧௡෤ ൫ തܲ௡෤൯ ൌ 
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(15) 
An investment subsidy s will be paid by the state to any firm undertaking investments in the 
respective industry. Accordingly, it reduces the initial investment outlay ܫ by a fixed 
proportion. Thus, ݇ in equation (12) is replaced by the effective producer’s total costs of 
investment ݇ᇱ: 
 ݇ᇱ ൌ ܫ ή ሺͳ െ ݏሻ ή ൛݁௥ήο௧ െ ሺͳ െ ߣሻൟ ൅ ܿ (16) 
Finally, the welfare effects of the market interventions can be quantified by determining the 
economic efficiency following Feil and Musshoff (2013). This allows for assessing and 
comparing the different intervention measures on a macroeconomic level. 
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4 Model assumptions for the application to the  
German dairy sector 
The developed real options market model is applied to the German dairy sector in this section. 
This sector is highly competitive, comprising 66,250 producers either classified as specialized 
dairy farms, or as dairying, rearing and fattening combined farms in 2010 (European 
Commission, 2013). This supports, or at least does not contradict, the applicability of the 
developed model framework. Mainly because of data availability problems, it is practically 
impossible to estimate the stochastic demand process ߤ௧ and its parameters empirically. 
Instead, following many other real options applications (e.g. Engel and Hyde, 2003; Price et 
al., 2005; Purvis et al., 1995; Tauer, 2006), an unregulated GBM is assumed for the price 
process. For this, the stochastic demand process following equation (2) can be transformed 
into the stochastic price process (Odening et al., 2007). Its parameters, the drift rate ߙො and the 
volatility ߪො, are estimated directly from empirical price data.4 It is crucial to use historical 
prices that have not, or to a minor extent, been affected by any market interventions. Hence, 
historical milk prices of Germany do not seem to be appropriate because of the EU milk price 
intervention system until 2007 and the existing EU milk quota system. In contrast, the dairy 
sector in New Zealand is not characterized by any significant political interventions and, 
therefore, the inflation-adjusted average prices for milksolid in New Zealand from 1973 to 
2012 are taken as a basis (LIC, 2012). Applying a variance ratio test to this time series, it is 
shown that the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected at a 5% significance 
level. Following common practice, this test result can be seen as a confirmation that an 
unregulated GBM represents an adequate model for the price process. Accordingly, the 
estimated drift rate ߙො is 1.31% and the volatility ߪො is 19.39%. Furthermore, in the literature a 
price elasticity for dairy products in Germany of ߟ ൌ-0.99 is reported (Thiele, 2008). A 
typical investment to build up milk production capacity suggested by the German Association 
for Technology and Structures in Agriculture (KTBL, 2013) is considered: an average milk 
yield of 7,000 kg per place, an initial investment outlay of 4,371 € per place or ܫ ൌ0.62 € per 
kg milk and a depreciation rate of ߣ ൌ4.25%. With this information, the parameters of the 
stochastic price process ߙො and ߪො can be re-transformed into the parameters of the stochastic 
demand process ߙ and ߪ, which yields ߙ ൌ-2.97% and ߪ ൌ19.59%. Since the GBM as 
stochastic demand process according to eq. (2) assumes infinitesimal time length steps and 
hence is impractical for simulation purposes, it is transformed into a time-discrete version. 
This can be done by the use of Ito’s Lemma (cf. Hull and White, 1987): 
 ߤ௧ାο௧ ൌ ߤ௧ ή ݁൤൬ఈି
ఙమ
ଶ ൰ήο௧ାఙήఌ೟ήξο௧൨ (17)
                                                          
4  This ‘standard procedure’, however, ignores the fact that empirical price data generated from a competitive 
market are necessarily realizations of the regulated price process and not of the unregulated process. 
Therefore, estimates of the parameters of the GBM will be biased, as they implicitly capture the effect of 
competitive market entry by mistake. Odening et al. (2007) analyse and assess these estimation biases.  
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with a standard normally distributed random number ߝ௧ and a time step length οݐ. Eq. (7) 
represents an exact approximation of the time-continuous GBM for any οݐ. For the risk-free 
discount rate, the arithmetic mean of the inflation-adjusted monthly average yields of listed 
federal securities with 15-30 years residual maturity for the period from 1989 to 2010 is 
calculated at 3.44% p.a. (Bundesbank, 2013). This corresponds to a time-continuous discount 
rate of ݎ ൌ3.38%. Including other relevant costs (e.g. heifer, fodder, labor and machine costs) 
and deducting the sales revenues for old cows and calves, the total costs of investment amount 
to ݇ ൌ0.35 € per kg milk. 
All parameters used for the calculations in the next two subsections are summarised in table 1. 
Table 1.  Model parameters for the application to the German dairy sector. 
Number of firms ܰ 50 
Maximum output capacity ܺ௖௔௣ 10 output units per firm 
Period under consideration ܶ Infinite, approximated by 100 years 
Milk yield 7000 kg per cow p.a. 
Investment outlay I         0.62 € per kg milk 
Geometric depreciation rate Ȝ 4.25% 
Useful lifetime of investment Infinite 
Risk-free time-continuous interest rate ݎ 3.38%  
(corresponding to a time-discrete interest rate of 3.44%)  
Total costs of investment ݇ 0.35 € per kg milk  
(including 0.05 € capital costs of investment) 
Reversibility rate of investment ݅ 0%, 50% 
Stochastic process of the demand parameter ߤ௧ Geometric Brownian motion (GBM) 
Parameters of the stochastic process  
Drift rate ߙ -2.97%  
Volatility ߪ 19.59% 
Time step length οݐ 1.00 
Price elasticity of demand ߟ -0.99 
Price floor ௠ܲ௜௡ 80%, 90% of ݇ 
5 Results 
The model results on firms’ optimal investment and disinvestment trigger prices and on the 
economic efficiencies for different levels of market intervention in the German dairy market 
are presented in table 2. The price floors are exogenously given with ௠ܲ௜௡ ൌ0%, 80% and 
95% of the total costs of investment ݇ ൌ1. To ensure comparability, the production ceilings 
and the investment subsidies are fixed by iterative searching, so that the resulting investment 
trigger prices (nearly) equal the ones of the predefined price floors. Hence, the stimulation of 
the willingness to invest is the assumed main policy goal of the analysis in this subsection. To 
additionally analyse the effects of partial reversibility of the investment costs, the calculations 
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in both subsections are each performed at ݅ ൌ0%, i.e. the investment costs are sunk in total, 
and at ݅ ൌ50%, i.e. only half of the investment costs are sunk and the other half can be 
recouped upon exit.  
The results presented in table 2 can be summarised as follows:
1. In highly competitive markets like the dairy sector, in which it can be assumed that the 
zero-profit-condition is fulfilled for the firms in the long run, the implementation or 
the increased use of market interventions generally induces a decline in investment 
trigger prices leading to an increase in the willingness to invest. For the respective 
measure, this can be explained as follows: The price floor acts like a lower reflecting 
barrier for the firms, whereby the expected future price rises. Therefore, a lower 
investment trigger price can already ensure a compensation of the investment costs by 
the present value of the expected cash flows. The production ceiling causes a reduction 
of the quantity supplied, which likewise leads to a higher expected future price and 
hence, to a lower investment trigger price. The investment subsidy reduces the invest-
ment costs; the required trigger price to compensate for these is thus reduced as well. 
2. The results show that market interventions have different effects on the disinvestment 
trigger price depending on the chosen measure. For the implementation of a price floor 
at both levels chosen ( ௠ܲ௜௡ ൌ80% and 95%), the disinvestment trigger price falls 
back to ܲ ൌ0.000 for both reversibility levels of the investment costs. The reason for 
this is that, at these guaranteed price floor levels, it is not worthwhile for the firms to 
abandon the investment at any expected product price level. In the case of implemen-
tation or the lowering of a production ceiling, the disinvestment trigger price increases. 
This can be explained by the lower investment trigger price (cf. 1.). Through this, 
potential upper price fluctuations, which could compensate for periods of low prices, 
are truncated and the firms abandon the investment earlier. Finally, the introduction 
and the increase of investment subsidies cause the disinvestment trigger price to 
decrease. This can be explained by two opposing effects: On one hand, the lowering of 
the investment trigger price induces a rise of the disinvestment trigger price, analogously 
to a production ceiling. On the other hand, the subsidy reduces the costs that can be 
recouped upon abandoning the investment (cf. equation (11)), whereby the firms 
abandon the investment later and the disinvestment trigger price decreases. As a result, 
this decreasing effect obviously overcompensates for the aforementioned increasing 
effect. 
3. Not considering disinvestment options, which in reality exist in the dairy sector, can 
lead to biases in policy impact analyses. In the present example, the effectiveness of 
production ceilings and investment subsidies with regard to a stimulation of the 
willingness to invest is underestimated: The required intervention levels to achieve a 
certain reduction of the investment trigger prices are lower in the case of partially 
reversible investment costs (݅ ൌ50%) compared to the case of investment costs, 
which are sunk in total (݅ ൌ0%). The reason for this is that, for ݅ ൌ50%, the 
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disinvestment trigger prices are higher for both market interventions, compared to the 
case of ݅ ൌ0% (cf. 2). Ceteris paribus, this already has a decreasing effect on the 
investment trigger price and hence, political intervention needs to be less intense to 
bring the investment trigger price down to the desired level. In the event of a price 
floor, the introduction of partial reversibility, by contrast, does not induce a lower 
intervention level. This directly follows the fact that the disinvestment trigger price is 
zero for both, totally sunk and partially reversible investment costs (cf. 2.). Therefore, 
the price floor levels to achieve a certain reduction of the investment trigger price 
ceteris paribus have to be the same for both scenarios (݅ ൌ0% and ݅ ൌ50%).   
4. The welfare is reduced through the implementation or the increased use of market 
interventions leading to lower economic efficiencies. Depending on the applied 
measure, this has different reasons: By introducing or increasing a price floor, the 
price level increases over time and, through this, the consumer surplus is reduced. In 
addition, the state budget is burdened due to the expenditures for the purchases of 
excess supply. By implementing a production ceiling, the consumer surplus is reduced 
through limiting the market supply. By introducing an investment subsidy, the state 
budget is burdened through paying a financial compensation to the investing firms. 
Moreover, the introduction of partial reversibility of the investment costs has an 
increasing effect on the economic efficiencies of production ceilings and investment 
subsidies. This directly follows from the fact that the required intervention levels for 
these two measures are lower (cf. 3), thus, the welfare is reduced less. Although the 
economic efficiencies change in absolute values for two of the three market 
interventions, the overall ranking remains the same for both investigated reversibility 
levels: Under the given stimulation of the willingness to invest, production ceilings 
and investments are more advantageous than price floors.  
6 Conclusive remarks 
The simultaneous analysis of firms’ investment and disinvestment decisions in the dairy 
sector under explicit consideration of different market interventions is of high practical 
relevance. The respective applicability of existing real options models, however, is very 
limited. Many of these models do not allow for the option to disinvest besides the option to 
invest. Furthermore, real options models typically do not consider competition and, in 
contrast to this, assume Leahy’s optimality property of myopic planning for their application 
to competitive markets. This, however, is based on very restrictive preconditions and especially 
complicates the analysis of investment and disinvestment decisions in markets characterised 
by market interventions, like the dairy sector. Those few models, which directly consider 
competition, again do not allow for disinvestments and, in addition, are very restricted in their 
modelling flexibility, for instance with regards to different market intervention measures. 
Hence, the objective of this paper was to analyse firms’ investment and disinvestment decisions 
in the dairy sector under simultaneous consideration of competition, uncertainty and market 
interventions. This was achieved by applying the model of Feil and Musshoff (2013) to the 
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German dairy sector. The model links GAs and stochastic simulation for its numerical solution. 
Through this, the direct determination of equilibria in competitive markets is enabled instead 
of determining the investment and disinvestment thresholds for a myopic planner according to 
Leahy’s theorem. Consequently, vast modelling flexibility is gained, for instance with respect 
to the implementation of different market interventions, which are relevant to the dairy sector. 
The results of the analysis underline the explanation potential of the model for both firms with 
regard to their optimal investment and disinvestment strategies in the dairy sector, as well as 
for agricultural politicians with regard to detailed policy impact analyses. Accordingly, it is 
shown that the implementation or the extension of market interventions, like the nation 
support programme for livestock farming in the newly-formed German states, generally 
increases the willingness to invest. At the same time, the effects on the willingness to abandon 
investments can be different depending on the measure used. While production ceilings 
increase the disinvestment speed, investment subsidies reduce it and price floors can even 
completely prevent the homogenous firms from disinvesting. Of course, these effects also 
apply in the opposite direction when market interventions are lowered or abolished completely, 
like the EU milk quota system by 2015. Furthermore, simulations of the model show that not 
considering partial reversibility of the investment costs can lead to an overestimation of the 
firms’ investment thresholds. At the same time, the effectiveness of specific market inter-
ventions, i.e. production ceilings and investment subsidies, with respect to increasing the 
firms’ willingness to invest can be underestimated. In result, the disregard of real existing 
disinvestment options can result in incorrect valuations of investment projects at firm level 
and in incorrect policy impact analyses at the macroeconomic level. To enable a direct 
comparison of competing market interventions, their welfare effects can be additionally 
quantified by means of the model. In the present case, the results suggest that for a given 
stimulation of the firms’ willingness to invest, both production ceilings and investment 
subsidies are preferable to price floors. 
However, it should be noted that the results of the present study are still based on some 
simplifying assumptions: In particular, the assumption of firms that are homogenous with 
respect to their production and investment possibilities represents a simplification from 
reality. Especially in the dairy sector, it is known that there can be considerable differences in 
the efficiency of firms in the same market, for example with some firms producing a milk 
yield of around 10,000 kg per cow and other firms producing of around 6,000 kg. In 
consequence, the investment trigger prices of the efficient firms will be considerable lower 
compared to those of the less efficient firms, rather than assuming just one equilibrium 
investment trigger price, which applies to all firms in the market. Moreover, the consideration 
of firm heterogeneity with regard to their efficiencies would also allow for the additional 
modelling of a quota market, where quota can be freely traded between the firms, like in the 
EU milk quota system.  
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